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pessoais:pedro:ler [2007/02/06 15:28] pedro |
pessoais:pedro:ler [2007/10/23 09:59] (atual) pedro |
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| ==== Assuntos ==== | ==== Assuntos ==== | ||
| spatial equilibrium models | spatial equilibrium models | ||
| + | ricardian equivalence ("tax now" or "tax later") | ||
| ==== Papers==== | ==== Papers==== | ||
| - | |||
| - | Marietto, M., David, N., Sichman, J. and Coelho, H. 2003. Requirement analysis of agent-based simulation platforms: State of the art and new prospects. Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence:125-141. | ||
| Parker, D., Berger, T. and Manson, S., editors. 2002. Agent-based models of land-use and land-cover change. LUCC Report Series, 6, Indiana University. | Parker, D., Berger, T. and Manson, S., editors. 2002. Agent-based models of land-use and land-cover change. LUCC Report Series, 6, Indiana University. | ||
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| Mertens and Lambin, 2000. land cover-change trajectories in southern cameroon. annals of the association of american geographers, 93, 467-494. | Mertens and Lambin, 2000. land cover-change trajectories in southern cameroon. annals of the association of american geographers, 93, 467-494. | ||
| (um modelo economico) | (um modelo economico) | ||
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| if it is not series-parallel. More generally, Pareto inefficient equilibria occur in a network if and only if one | if it is not series-parallel. More generally, Pareto inefficient equilibria occur in a network if and only if one | ||
| of three simple networks is embedded in it.// | of three simple networks is embedded in it.// | ||
| - | |||
| - | ===A random matching theory=== | ||
| - | [[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/geb/aliprantis_random_matching_06.pdf|C.D. Aliprantis and G. Camera and D. Puzzellob, 2006]] | ||
| - | |||
| - | //We develop theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching processes. We formalize the mechanics | ||
| - | of matching, and study the links between properties of the different processes and trade frictions. | ||
| - | A particular emphasis is placed on providing a mapping between matching technologies and informational | ||
| - | constraints.// | ||
| ===Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence=== | ===Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence=== | ||
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| ===Noncooperative Bargaining and Spatial Competition=== | ===Noncooperative Bargaining and Spatial Competition=== | ||
| - | [[|H. Bester, 1989]] | + | H. Bester, 1989. |
| Econometrica | Econometrica | ||
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| ===The Evolution of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations=== | ===The Evolution of Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations=== | ||
| - | [[|S. Bowles and H. Gintis, 2003]] | + | S. Bowles and H. Gintis, 2003 |
| //How do human groups maintain a high level of cooperation despite a low | //How do human groups maintain a high level of cooperation despite a low | ||
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| to Nash equilibrium. This research is of interest to computer scientists | to Nash equilibrium. This research is of interest to computer scientists | ||
| because modern game theory is a natural framework in which to formally study | because modern game theory is a natural framework in which to formally study | ||
| - | multi-agent systems and distributed computing.// | + | multi-agent systems and distributed computing. |
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| also briefly considered, as is the extent to which the exact analytic methods | also briefly considered, as is the extent to which the exact analytic methods | ||
| yield results for simple models in game theory.// | yield results for simple models in game theory.// | ||
| - | |||
| - | ===Experiences Creating Three Implementations of the Repast Agent Modeling Toolkit=== | ||
| - | |||
| - | [[|M. J. North and N. T. Collier and J. R. Vos]] | ||
| - | |||
| - | Many agent-based modeling and simulation researchers and practitioners have | ||
| - | called for varying levels of simulation interoperability ranging from shared | ||
| - | software architectures to common agent communications languages. These calls have | ||
| - | been at least partially answered by several specifications and technologies. In | ||
| - | fact, Tanenbaum [1988] has remarked that the "nice thing about standards is that | ||
| - | there are so many to choose from." Tanenbaum goes on to say that "if you do not | ||
| - | like any of them, you can just wait for next year's model." This article does not | ||
| - | seek to introduce next year's model. Rather, the goal is to contribute to the | ||
| - | larger simulation community the authors' accumulated experiences from developing | ||
| - | several implementations of an agent-based simulation toolkit. As such, this | ||
| - | article focuses on the implementation of simulation architectures rather than | ||
| - | agent communications languages. It is hoped that ongoing architecture standards | ||
| - | efforts will benefit from this new knowledge and use it to produce architecture | ||
| - | standards with increased robustness.// | ||
| ===Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining=== | ===Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining=== | ||
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| + | ===Spatial Games with Adaptive Tit-for-Tats=== | ||
| + | [[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/tzafestas00.pdf|E. S. Tzafestas, 2000]] | ||
| - | + | //This paper presents an adaptive tit-for-tat strategy and a study of its | |
| - | + | behavior in spatial IPD games. The adaptive tit-for-tat strategy is shown | |
| - | + | elsewhere to demonstrate high performance in IPD tournaments or individual | |
| + | IPD games with other types of strategies, and obtains higher scores than the | ||
| + | pure tit-for-tat strategy. In spatial IPD games, the strategy exhibits stability and | ||
| + | resistance to perturbations, and those properties are more pronounced in | ||
| + | variations of the spatial game model that induce some degree of “noise” : | ||
| + | probabilistic winning, spatial irregularity and continuous time. The adaptive tit- | ||
| + | for-tat strategy is also compared to pure tit-for-tat and found to be more stable | ||
| + | and predominant in perturbed environments.// | ||
| ==== Journals ==== | ==== Journals ==== | ||
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| ==== Pages ==== | ==== Pages ==== | ||
| - | CASA - Centre for Advanced Spatial Analysis (http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/news/index.htm). | + | |
| + | Program for Evolutionary Dynamics (Harvard University) | ||
| ==== Authors ==== | ==== Authors ==== | ||
| - | ===Jaime Simão SICHMAN=== | ||
| - | |||
| - | Vale uma olhadela no site deste cara. | ||
| - | E professor da USP Poli com interfaces com Portugal e Franca e no Brasil na area de | ||
| - | Multi-agentes. | ||
| - | |||
| - | http://www.pcs.usp.br/~jaime/#projetos | ||
| ===Samuel Bowles=== | ===Samuel Bowles=== | ||
| Linha 574: | Linha 542: | ||
| with **Hebert Gintis**: [[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/bowles_inheritance_of_inequality.pdf|The inheritance of inequality]], 2002 | with **Hebert Gintis**: [[http://leg.ufpr.br/~pedro/papers/bowles_inheritance_of_inequality.pdf|The inheritance of inequality]], 2002 | ||
| + | |||
| + | === Portugali e Benenson=== | ||
| + | Segregação | ||
